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Abstract
This article focuses on the distinctions that the ad hoc Tribunals
have drawn between the comparative law method and the review of
evidence for clarifying customary international law and general principles
of law. It outlines the dangers in the readiness of some international
judges to accept narrow inquiries, which at best attach special weight and
at worst restrict the scope of inquiry to a single, specific legal system. The
readiness of some international judges to simply elevate legal rules and
concepts with which they are familiar from their own legal education and
practice to the level of universal truths may imply a failure to understand
the other legal traditions on offer. The article concludes by showing that,
unless the dangers inherent in the readiness to accept narrow inquiries are
clearly emphasized, the achievement of an international criminal justice
that is truly tolerant of plurality is a long way off.
1. Introduction
The former Israeli Supreme Court Chief Justice, Aharon Barak,
describes comparative law as an "experienced friend."' Although he makes
this comment in relation to national jurisdictions, some judges at the UN
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the UN
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the "ad hoc Tribunals")^ have
I ©2012 Borda.
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80 TUL. L. REV. (2005-2006) 195, at 196.
^ The UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"),
established by the Security Council of the United Nations in 1993, pursuant to
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also seen the benefit of consulting this "experienced fi-iend" in the course of
their jurisprudence.
Particularly when intemational criminal law was still at a mdimentary
stage of its development,^ intemational judges sometimes adopted a
comparative law methodology and undertook a comparative analysis of
legislation and case law.'' While acknowledging that comparative law can
provide a fruitful point of reference, this article seeks to highlight the
distinctions that the ad hoc Tribunals have drawn between the comparative
law method and the review of evidence for elucidating customary
intemational law and general principles of law.
This article begins by providing a brief overview of the descriptive
and interpretive phases of the comparative law method before considering the
points of interaction between national and intemational juridical spaces. It
then discusses customary international law and general principles in the light
of this method, finding that there is much to be gained from consulting the
experience of comparative law. In the final section, the article considers
instances in which the ad hoc Tribunals were ready to accept narrow inquiries
and underscores the dangers with such an approach.
2. Comparative Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunals
A. An Overview of Comparative Law
resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 and resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 (U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808(1993); U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); and the UN Intemational Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), established by the United Nations Security Council
by its resolution 935 of 8 November 1999 (UN Document SIRES1955 of 8
November 1994).
^ Cassese, 'The influence of the European Court of Human Rights on
intemational criminal tribunals - some methodological remarks', in M Bergsmo and
A Eide, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN: ESSAYS DM
HONOUR OF ASBJ0RN EIDE (2003), at 19.
Admittedly, this may sometimes have been for instrumental reasons. Judge
Cassese, the first president of the ICTY, stated: "Mon experience est que souvent le
droit compare est utilise pour confirmer une solution que l'on avait déjà trouvée." See
Cassese, during a round table talk, printed in CRIMES INTERNATIONAUX ET
JURISDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES 140 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & Antonio Cassese
eds. (2002), cited in Bohlander and Findlay, 'The Use of Domestic Sources as a Basis
for Intemational Criminal Law Principles', in the GLOBAL COMMUNITY YEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE (2002) 2, at 25.
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In 'The Science of Comparative Law', Schmitthoff holds that
comparative law is characterized by a broad and fundamental distinction
between "the activities concerned with the collation of facts and the
utilization of the results gained by comparison. The first phase is
mainly descriptive; it consists in examining the reaction of a number of
legal systems to an individual legal problem. The second stage is
concerned with the utilization of the results obtained in the first phase, and
this utilization can be effectedforagreat variety of reasons."'
The first phase of comparative law, according to Schmitthoff,
assumes the existence of the following prerequisites: "First, the topic or
topics under examination must be comparable, secondly, regard must be
had to their legal and social background, and thirdly, an analytical
classification of an impartial and purely scientific character must be
applied to the matters under investigation."*
Establishing a basis of comparability for the relevant topics, such as a
common underlying ideology, is a prerequisite of comparative law.
Schmitthoff states that comparative law has to confine itself to legal systems
which have reached the same (comparable) level of evolution.'
Barak has argued that comparative law is not merely the comparison
of laws and that a useful comparison can only exist if the legal systems being
compared share a common ideological basis.* Thus, with respect to
democratic legal systems, a meaningful comparison could only be had with
other democratic legal systems.'
Indeed, critics of comparative law are keen to emphasize the inherent
incomparability of legal systems and some go to the extreme of denying that a
sound basis of comparability can ever be established satisfactorily. A Hong
Kong High Court judge, for instance, held that resort to foreign judgments
should be eschewed because they were the product of very different
^ Schmitthoff, 'The Science of Comparative Law', 7 CAMBRIDGE L.J. (1939-
1941) 94, at 95.
* Ibid., at 96.
''ibid.
* Barak, supra note 1, at 196.
^Ibid.
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circumstances and situations. It was considered, therefore, that the systems
were simply incomparable.'"
While Schmitthoff characterizes the first phase of comparative law as
mainly descriptive, requiring the collation of facts and their analytical
classification to be of an impartial and purely scientific character, he
recognizes that complete impartiality is, in practice, unattainable. Some
degree of critical analysis is inevitable even at this early stage, conceding that
the accumulation of facts is impossible without critical analysis."
It is clear that elements of subjectivity come into play the moment
categories are drawn and critical, value-laden assessments relating to the
collation of facts are made. While recognizing that some form of critical
subjectivity is therefore inevitable. Schmitthoff holds that the reliability of the
process ultimately depends on the tact and experience of the researcher.'^
The second phase of comparative law relates to the interpretation and
utilization of the results gained, with the uUimate aim being, inter alia, to
enlarge the general knowledge of the law or, in the case of applied
comparative law, to seek to improve one's own legal system, or to seek to
avoid confiict, such as through the harmonization or unification of laws, or
the development of model laws.
B. Interaction Between the Domestic and International Juridical Spaces
Ellis observes that international law has a good deal to learn from
municipal legal systems, given the interdependence of domestic and
international law in such areas as criminal liability.'^ This interaction
between national and international legal spaces has been at the heart of global
criminal justice since at least the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals.'"
'" R V Town Planning Board, ex parte Kwan Kong Ltd (1995) 5 HKPLR 261.
Cited in McCrudden, 'A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial
Conversations on Constitutional Rights', 20 OXFORD J LEGAL STUDIES (2000) 4, at 6.
' ' Schmitthoff, supra note 5, at 99.
''Ibid.
'^  Ellis, 'General Principles and Comparative Law', 22 EUROPEAN J OF INT'L L.
(2011) 4, at 949.
See Delmas-Marty, 'Interactions between National and International Criminal
Law in the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the I C C , 4 7INT CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2006)
I , a t 2 .
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Both ad hoc Tribunals are bound to interpret and apply international
law, as found in the formal sources of law enshrined in Article 38(l)(a) - (c)
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ( Id) , namely, international
conventions, international custom, and general principles of law.
Moreover, with respect to rules of procedure and evidence, the judges
at the ad hoc Tribunals were accorded substantial rule-making power. States
accepted this as an inevitable corollary of the creation of the ad hoc Tribunals,
given that they were created under great pressure and time constraints and for
which no detailed procedural framework was formulated by the drafters of
their constituent statutes.'^ Through their powers to draft, amend and
interpret rules of procedure and evidence, international judges act as both the
architects and deliverers ofthe international criminal procedural system.'*
This system has been particularly infiuenced by the common and civil law
traditions,'^ the two main legal traditions in the West.'^
C. The Application Of Comparative Law By The Ad Hoc Tribunals
One author has observed that the attraction of comparative law stems
from the sources of international criminal law, at least to the extent that
custom and general principles of law are partly based on national law." This
section will explore the interrelation between comparative law, on the one
hand, and customary international law and general principles of law, on the
other.
1. Comparative Law and Customary International Law
According to the International Cotirt of Justice (the "ICJ"), the two
material sources of customary international law are the practice and opinio
' ' Sluiter, 'Procedural Lawmaking at the International Criminal Tdbunals', in
Darcy and Powdedy, JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS (2010), at 315.
'* Byrne, 'The new public international lawyer and the hidden art of international
cdminal tdal practice', 25 CONNECTICUT J INT'LL. (2005) 243, at 248 and 259.
'^/¿id., at 248 and 255.
" Picker, 'A Framework for Comparative Analyses of International Law and its
Institutions: Using the Example of the World Trade Organization', in Cashin Ritaine,
Donlan and Sychold (eds.). COMPARATIVE LAW AND HYBRID LEGAL TRADITIONS, 67
Publication ofthe Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (2009). Several ofthe author's
views are applicable here, although he was wdting in relation to the WTO.
" Delmas-Marty, 'The Contdbution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist
Conception of International Cdminal Law', 1 JINT'LCRIM. JUSTICE (2003) 13.
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juris of States.^" The process of clarifying customary international law,
therefore, requires reviewing evidence from, inter alia, national jurisdictions
in order to make out these material sources. Both ad hoc Tribunals have
frequently engaged in this process, particularly as the ICTY was expressly
required, by the UN Secretary-General's report,^' to apply rules which were
beyond any doubt part of customary international law.
The process of reviewing evidence in the context of clarifying the
content of customary international law resembles Schmitthoff s first phase of
comparative law, namely, the "collation of facts" phase.^^ Indeed, on at least
one occasion, the ad hoc Tribunals considered the processes of "review" and
of "comparative analysis" as interchangeable. In Kunarac, the Trial Chamber
had had recourse to various legislation and case laws in relation to the
definition of rape.^ ^ In describing this process, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Kunarac termed it a "review":
127. After an extensive review of the Tribunal's jurisprudence and
domestic laws from multiple jurisdictions, the [Kunarac] Trial Chamber
concluded [...]^" (Emphasis added)
While the ICTR Trial Chamber in Semanza termed the same process a
"comparative analysis":
345. While this mechanical style of defining rape was originally
rejected by this Tribunal, the Chamber finds the comparative
analysis in Kunarac to be persuasive...^^ (Emphasis added)
In considering whether acts of looting constituted the specific offence
of plunder, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Simic made reference to "comparative
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya I Malta), ICJ REPORTS (1985), 29-
30, at 27.
'^ Paragraph 34 of the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of
Security Council resolution 808 (1993) and Annex thereto, U.N. Doc. S/25704.
^^  See supra, at 2.
^' Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Ko vac and Zoran Vukovic (2001),
IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, at 447-456.
"^ Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Ko vac and Zoran Vukovic (2002),
IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
ICTY Appeals Chamber, at 127.
^' Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza (2003), ICTR-97-20-T, ICTR Trial Chamber,
at 345.
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legal sources" in concluding that the two terms are generally used
synonymously.^^
In his Separate Opinion in Halilovic, Judge Schomburg considered
that there was no need to engage in a "comparative legal analysis" with
respect to the question of whether someone qualified as a suspect, as the
statutory definition of the term was sufficiently clear.^'
While it is undoubted that the collation of facts in the context of
comparative law and the review of evidence in the context of customary
intemational law share some important similarities, the two processes have to
be distinguished.
Establishing a valid basis of comparabihty between the legal systems
that are to be compared is a prerequisite of any comparative legal analysis.
For instance, it is appropriate to recall Barak's argument that a useful
comparison can only exist if the legal systems being compared share a
common ideological basis.^^ Furthermore, comparative law prescribes no
minimum number of jurisdictions or systems to be compared. A meaningful
comparative analysis can be had between just two or a few jurisdictions and
the strength of the comparison depends, inter alia, on the comparability of
those jurisdictions, such as whether they share a common ideological basis.
Article 38(l)(b) of the ICJ Statute, on the other hand, explicitly
prescribes that, for the purposes of customary international law, evidence of a
general practice has to be established. A review undertaken with the aim of
clarifying the contents of customary international law has to be broad enough
to provide evidence of an extensive and representative practice, although
evidence that a practice is universal is not necessary.^' Contrary to .
*^ The Trial Chamber also made use of linguistic sources. See Prosecutor v.
Blagoje Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Simo Zaric (2003), IT-95-9-T, ICTY Trial Chamber,
at 98.
" Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovic (2007), IT-01-48-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber,
Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, at 4.
*^ Supra, at 2.
^' See Henckaerts, 'Study on customary intemational humanitarian law: A
contribution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict', 87
INT'LREV. OF THE RED CROSS (2005) 857, at 180. Although, "[i]t is settled that
uniformity of acceptance or observance is not required for proof of the emergence of
a new norm of customary intemational law, generality being enough." See Prosecutor
V. Anto Furundzija (2000), IT-95-17/1-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Declaration of
Judge Shahabuddeen, at 257.
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comparative law, therefore, the review of evidence from just two or a few
jurisdictions would not, normally, be sufficient for customary intemational
law.
Moreover, the establishment of a basis of comparability is not a
prerequisite in customary intemational law. Indeed, in her review of
evidence, in the context of clarifying customary international law, the
intemational judge should not restrict her search to, for instance, only legal
systems which share a common ideological basis. She is guided by the
imperatives of extensiveness and representativeness.
Schmitthoff acknowledged that, in comparative analysis, some level
of subjectivity was inevitable at the collation of facts phase.^° In undertaking
comparative legal analysis with respect to a particular crime, for instance, the
comparatist is not bound by the formal classification of this crime by the
domestic criminal codes of States. The comparatist has the latitude to delve
deeper and, having regard to the political, social and other context in the
States under comparison, question whether the formal classifications are
appropriate and/or whether other crimes, not formally classified as such,
should also be included in the comparison. This is an inherently subjective
exercise.
In reviewing the legislation and case law of, inter alia, national
jurisdictions in search of evidence for the clarification of customary
international law, the international judge undertakes an eminently empirical
review. In conducting this review, the intemational judge is not primarily
concemed with establishing a basis for comparison between the systems. She
is not expected, for instance, to confine her search to systems which share a
common ideological basis. Her main objective is rather to gather extensive
and representative evidence that relates to the content of a rule of customary
international law.
Given that the authority of the international judge to elucidate
customary intemational law derives from State consent, she is not, unlike the
comparatist who has far greater latitude in this regard, normally expected to
second guess the formal, legal classifications of crimes by States or to
undertake anything other than an impressionistic assessment of domestic
legislation and case laws. The difference is therefore one of degree: the
intemational judge is not expected to enter into the same level of critical
analysis of legislation and case law as a comparatist. In her review of
, at3.
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extensive and representative evidence to clarify customary international law,
she is rather expected, generally, to accept domestic legal classifications at
face value - without trying to second guess them. This is attested by
Bohlander and Findlay who, in their research of early decisions of the ICTY,
observe that "the judges in the Tribunal only quote the words of [domestic]
legislation without interpreting and declaring their meaning."^'
2. Comparative Law and General Principles of Law
Refiecting on general principles of law, Ellis contends that "[t]he vast
scholarship on comparative law seems to have had little influence on most
international jurists contemplafing general principles of international law."''^
She asserts that comparative scholarship provides a rich source of guidance
for international judges with respect to general principles ^^
In identifying general principles of law, Cassese sets forth the following
conditions:
(i) unless indicated by an international rule, reference should not be
made to one national legal system only, say that of common-law or that
of civil-law States. Rather; international courts must draw upon the
general concepts and legal institutions common to all the major legal
systems of the world. This pre-supposes a process of identification of
the common denominators in these legal systems so as to pinpoint the
basic notions they share;
(ii) since 'international trials exhibit a number of features that
differentiate them from national criminal proceedings' [reference is
made here to Judge Cassese's Separate and Dissenting Opinion in
Erdemovic, 7 October 1997], account must be taken of the specificity
of international criminal proceedings when utilising naüonal law
notions. In this way a mechanical importation or transposifion from
national law into international criminal proceedings is avoided, as well
as the attendant distortions of the unique traits of such proceedings
(para. 178).^"
'^ Bohlander and Findlay, supra note 4, at 16.
^^  Ellis, supra note 13, at 949-951.
''Ibid.
"^ Cassese, 'The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia to the Ascertainment of general Principles of Law Recognized by
the Community of Nations', in Sienho Yee and Wang Tieya (eds.). INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD - ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF LI HAOPEI (2001 ).
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While the process of identifying general principles of law, like that of
reviewing evidence for customary international law, may appear similar to the
process of collating facts in the context of comparative law, there are, even
here, some important distinctions.
Fundamentally, the method of identifying general principles is
premised on the principle of representativeness.^^ For instance, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic made it clear that the threshold for identifying
general principles of law is high, in the sense that it needed to be shown that
the principle was part of most, if not all, national legal systems.^* Such a high
threshold of representativeness is not generally a requirement of comparative
law.
In reviewing the legislation and case laws of national jurisdictions in
order to identify (or, indeed, to rule out) a general principle of law, the
international judge is guided by imperatives of representativeness. Again,
establishing a basis of comparability is not a prerequisite in the process.
This is bolstered by the fact that, although Article 38(l)(c) ofthe ICJ
Statute still formally requires international judges to direct their attention
towards general principles of law recognized hy civilized nations, it is widely
accepted that this qualification has become redundant, and reference to
"civilized" nations is now broadly understood to mean all nations.^'
Therefore, the criterion of "civilized", which may have provided a possible
basis for comparison, has given way to the imperative of representativeness.
Judge Shahabuddeen observed, in his declaration in the Furundzija
appeal, that general principles of law were:
not so much generalizations reached by application of comparative law
... as particularizations of a common underlying sense of what is just in
the circumstances.^^
^^  Ellis, supra note 13, at 953-954.
'* See NoUkaemper, 'Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International
Law: An Analysis of the Practice of the ICTY', in G Boas and W Schabas,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS DM THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY
(2003), at 287.
" See, for instance, Shirley V. Scot, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS:
AN INTRODUCTION (2n Ed.) (2010), at 11.
^' Furundzija, Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen, supra note 29, at 260.
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While a comparatist may seek to extract the "essence of rules'',^' an
international judge, in drawing upon national principles for the purpose of
identifying general principles of law, seeks out the "common underlying
sense" of justice rather than the "essence" of the principles. The identification
of general principles of law is not arrived at on the basis of a lowest common
denominator formula but, rather, on the basis of justice and morality."° The
international judge does not, therefore, seek to establish the "commonality" or
"essence" of a set of principles, rather, she seeks to determine, on the basis of
a representative set of national principles, what the interests of justice require
in the particular circumstances of the case. The process is juridical rather than
technical.
It may be in this sense that Cassese notes "... although the search for
and the identification of a general principle can be accomplished by
academics, it is only after such a principle has been legally found, through an
appropriate and cogent legal reasoning, by a court of law that its existence can
no longer be questioned.""'
In her article, Ellis asserts that, if general principles are to be a viable
source of law in a heterogeneous society, this source will have to be
rethought."^ She holds that representativeness should be removed as a
requirement for the identification of general principles and suggests, rather,
that these should be grounded in the soundness and persuasiveness of legal
argumentation:
This would mean that the validity of a general principle would have to
be grounded in the soundness and persuasiveness of legal
argumentation rather than in claims about the objective nature of law or
implicit State consent."^
This argument is premised on a perception of general principles as
mere generalizations, rather than, as Judge Shahabuddeen notes,
particularizations of a common underlying sense of what is just in the
circumstances.
^^  Ellis, supra note 13, at 949. The author notes that some comparatists doubt
"the possibility of isolating the essence of a legal rule", ibid., at 959.
" Furundzija, Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen, supra note 29, at 260.
"' Cassese, supra note 34.
"^  Ellis, .swpra note 13, at 971.
"^  Ellis, supra note 13, at 971.
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Ellis recognizes that much of the controversy surrounding general
principles relates to their underlying sources of validity, in that, recourse to
general principles has sometimes been tainted with charges of judicial law-
making.'^ However, the altemative she advances is likely to exacerbate such
controversy, because she proposes to do away altogether with the requirement
of representativeness, which helps to preserve some degree of objectivity in
the process and, rather, to ground general principles merely in the
persuasiveness of the legal arguments of intemational judges.'*^
According to this approach, general principles would emanate from
sound and persuasive legal arguments, without there being any reference to
whether these arguments are representative or whether they refiect the
position of just one or a handful of jurisdictions.
3. Conclusion
With the above qualifications in mind, international judges have seen
the usefulness of drawing on the experience of comparative law in arriving at
a better understanding of customary intemational law and general principles
of law. For instance, in his dissent in Simic, Judge Schomburg drew
extensively on the Comparative Analysis of Legal Systems'^^ carried out by the
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und intemationales Strafrecht to
provide an understanding of which States include co-perpetratorship in their
criminal codes.'"
D. Reflections on the Acceptance of Narrow Inquiries
Judge Shahabuddeen has observed that "it should be recalled that
intemational criminal.law has not quite gone through the early phase of
general intemational law, when the latter borrowed with relative freedom
"*" Ellis, supra note 13, at 949-950.
"' Ellis, supra note 13, at 971.
Participation in Crime: Criminal Liability of Leaders of Criminal Groups and
Networks,
Expert Opinion, Commissioned by the United Nations - Intemational Criminal
Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor- Project Coordination: Prof. Dr. Ulrich
Sieber., Pdv. Doz. Dr. Hans-Georg Koch, Jan Michael Simon, Max-Planck-Institut
für ausländisches und intemationales Strafrecht, Freiburg, Germany.
"' Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simic (2006), IT-95-9-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber,
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, at 14.
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from West European domestic law.""* Judges at the ad hoc Tribunals have
alternated, through judicial interpretation, between further propagating this
influence and seeking to supplant it by reference to the sui generis nature of
the ad hoc Tribunals.
In her consideration of the ICTY Appeal Chamber's approach in
Erdemovic'*^ in relation to the acceptance by the Tribunal of à guilty plea,
Ellis notes that, "it was difficult to approach this matter from the point of view
of general principles, because only common law systems know a guilty plea,
and the judges could therefore not demonstrate the representativeness of any
relevant principles. They concluded that reference could and should be had to
common law adversarial systems from which the rule in the Statute was
derived."'" She prefers this narrow inquiry, confined as it was to common
law systems because it enabled the intemational judges to gain "insights
generated by decades, even centuries, of collected experience at the municipal
level." Indeed, she takes issue with Cassese for concluding that "such
recourse was not permitted by law and, furthermore, was unacceptable.""
On his part, Cassese objected to the strong tendency to refer to
adversarial systems in seeking to interpret and apply the statute, arguing that
the result would skew the ICTY's approach towards such systems. He found
that all the guidance that the Tribunal required in considering a guilty plea
could be found in the statute and rules of procedure.'^
The ICTR Appeals Chamber in Rutaganda adopted a similar
approach with respect to the scope of cross-examination." After noting that
the rules of procedure and evidence gave little indication as to the scope of
cross-examination and while underscoring that the ICTR was not bound by
domestic rules of evidence, the Appeals Chamber noted that the ICTR's rules
of procedure and evidence on cross-examination were pattemed after the
United States' Federal Rules of Evidence and held that the interpretation of
"' Shahabuddeen, 'Judicial Creativity and Joint Criminal Enterprise', in S Darcy
and J Powderly, JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
(2010), at 186.
"' Prosecutor v. Erdemovic (1997), IT-96-22-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber.
'" Ellis, supra note 13, at 969.
" Ibid.
''Ibid.
'^ Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda v. The Prosecutor (2003), ICTR-
96-3-A, ICTR Appeals Chamber.
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some of these rules could indeed be guided by the domestic system after
which they were patterned.^"
In discussing the procedure for a motion for a judgement of acquittal
after the close of the prosecution case, Michael and Findlay observe that in
J elisio ^ ^ the ICTY Appeals Chamber took the view that this procedure has,
with some exceptions, no real legislative equivalent in civil law systems.^*
The Tribunal in this case was ready to accept a narrow inquiry and relied
solely on common law sources which formally recognized such a procedure.
Michael and Findlay, however, make the point that, had a more rigorous
inquiry been undertaken, the Tribunal would have found that in some civil
law States, such as Germany, "it is not exceptional for a judge in a criminal
case, after having heard the prosecution evidence to tell the prosecution and
the defence that he is not convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the
prosecution case, that he does not need to hear the defence evidence at all, and
intends to proceed to an acquittal at once."^^ The authors maintain that, had
the Tribunal broadened the scope of inquiry on this question, the conclusion
reached in practice may not have been different, "but it would be founded on
a balanced and thoroughly researched basis ."^ ^
The readiness of some judges at the ad hoc Tribunals to accept a
narrow inquiry, which at best attaches special weight and at worst confined
the scope of the review to a single, specific legal system, has not been limited
to procedural rules only. Indeed, some judges have been ready to accept such
a narrow inquiry in connection with the process of clarifying customary
international law. For instance, with respect to the crime of conspiracy to
commit genocide and the question of whether the agreement required for
conspiracy must be formal and explicit, the ICTR Appeals Chamber in
Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze referred exclusively to the national case
law of the United States and the United Kingdom in concluding that such
agreement need neither be formal nor explicit.^'
The ICTR Appeal Chamber's readiness to accept this narrow inquiry,
confined as it was to the jurisprudence of only two, common law, jurisdictions
can be contrasted with the partial dissent of Judge Shahabuddeen in the same
" Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic (2001), IT-95-10-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, at 30.
*^ Bohlander and Findlay, supra note 4, at 16-17.
" Ibid.
''Ibid
'^ Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The
Prosecutor (2007), ICTR-99-52-A, ICTR Appeals Chamber, at 894 - 899.
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case, who addressed an analogous question with extensive reference to both
common law and civil law traditions.*
With respect to judicial interpretation, therefore, while the national
legal traditions on which the articles and rules in question are modeled can
provide some guidance, over-reliance on a narrow inquiry can lead to the
perpetuation ofthe default position, according to which some international
judges "interpret legal norms through the lexicons of their respective
traditions,"^' rather than through a truly sui generis prism. This contributes to
the pervasive perception that some international judges simply "elevat[e] legal
rules and concepts with which [they] are familiar from their own legal
education and practice to the level of universal truths.. .".^ ^
The argument may be made that, in accepting narrow inquiries,
international judges are merely giving effect to the intention of the drafters of
the statutes or rules of procedure, who may have borrowed a rule from a
specific legal system. However, drafters' intent is only one of a number of
possible approaches international judges may have recourse to when
interpreting a statute.*^ Moreover, an approach confined to a specific legal
system tends to ignore the mandate of the ad hoc Tribunals to ensure
international criminal procedure is not unduly infiuenced by a single legal
tradition.^
This point was underscored in Kordic where, in the context of
interpreting rule 98bis(B) ofthe Statute, the Prosecutor referred to the
proceedings under this rule as "no case to answer," using the description
found in many common law jurisdictions. However, the Trial Chamber held:
... [T]he Chamber considers that the better approach is not to
characterise Rule 98bis proceedings in that way, lest it be thought that
the Rule must necessarily be applied in the same way as proceedings
for "no case to answer" in those jurisdictions. It is true that Rule 98bis
proceedings, coming as they do at the end ofthe Prosecution's case.
*" Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The
Prosecutor (2007), ICTR-99-52-A, ICTR Appeals Chamber, Partly Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 3 - 6.
'^ Byrne, supra note 16, at 252.
" Ellis, supra note 13, at 965.
*^  Grover, 'A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the
Interpretation of Cdmes in the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court', 21
EUROPEAN J. OF INT'LL. (2010) 3, at 541.
*" Bohlander and Findlay, supra note 33, at 23.
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bear a close resemblance to applications for no case to answer in
common law jurisdictions. However, that does not necessarily mean
that the regime to be applied for Rule 98bis proceedings is the same as
that which is applicable in the domestic jurisdictions of those countries.
Ultimately, the regime to be applied for Rule 98bis proceedings is to be
determined on the basis of the Statute and the Rules, having in mind, in
particular, its construction in the light of the context in which the
Statute operates and the purpose it is intended to serve. That
determination may be influenced by features of the regime in domestic
jurisdictions with similar proceedings, but will not be controlled by it;
and therefore a proper construction of the Rule may show a
modification of some of those features in the transition from its
domestic berth . '^
3. Conclusion
There may be broader risks related to the readiness of some
international judges to accept a narrow inquiry and to elevate approaches and
practices from a single legal tradition to the level of universal truths. One
possible risk concerns the potential effects of an approach which focuses
disproportionately on the experiences of Westem liberal perspectives while
overlooking those of emerging democracies. This was highlighted by Judge
Meron's partial dissent in the Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze case.*^
Judge Meron took issue with the Trial Chamber's finding that "hate speech
that expresses ethnic and other forms of discrimination violates the norm of
customary international law prohibiting discrimination."*^ He reasoned that,
although courts and commentators ftom Western liberal democracies can
often be tempted, from an ex post perspective, to claim that no harm, and in
fact much good, can come ftom the suppression of particularly odious ideas
and hate speech, the reason for protecting hate speech lies in the ex ante
benefits. The protection of speech, even speech that is unsettling and
^^  Decision on defence motions for judgment of acquittal, IT-95-14/2-T,
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, 6 April 2000 at 9. This reasoning was
cited approvingly by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Judgment, IT-95-10-A,
Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 5 July 2001, at 33.
*^  Although, admittedly, this case did not directly concern the acceptance by the
ICTR Trial Chamber of a narrow inquiry. See Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor (2007), ICTR-99-52-A, ICTR Appeals
Chamber, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Meron.
*'/¿id., at 5 -12 .
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uncomfortable, is important in enabling political opposition, especially in
emerging democracies, to take *^
A readiness to accept narrow inquiries may imply a failure to
understand the other legal traditions on offer. This approach may also imply a
failure to recognize that intemational trials exhibit a number of features that
differentiate them from national criminal proceedings.*' Such an approach
does not take account of the specificity of intemational criminal proceedings
and risks distorting the existing differences and forcing uncomfortable
compromises. Unless the dangers inherent in the readiness to accept narrow
inquiries are clearly emphasized, in the words of Bohlander and Findlay,
"then the achievement of an intemational criminal justice, resilient and
tolerant of plurality is a long way off."'"
^ Ibid., at 10.
' Cassese, supra note 34.
' Bohlander and Findlay, supra note 4, at 26.
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